From \u3cem\u3eBoard of Regents\u3c/em\u3e to \u3cem\u3eO\u27Bannon\u3c/em\u3e: How Antitrust and Media Rights Have Influenced College Football by Thomas A. Baker III & Natasha T. Brison
Marquette Sports Law Review
Volume 26
Issue 2 Symposium: The Changing Landscape of
Collegiate Athletics
Article 5
From Board of Regents to O'Bannon: How Antitrust
and Media Rights Have Influenced College
Football
Thomas A. Baker III
Natasha T. Brison
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw
Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Thomas A. Baker III and Natasha T. Brison, From Board of Regents to O'Bannon: How Antitrust and Media Rights Have Influenced College
Football, 26 Marq. Sports L. Rev. 331 (2016)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/sportslaw/vol26/iss2/5
BAKER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2016 5:29 PM 
 
FROM BOARD OF REGENTS TO O’BANNON: 
HOW ANTITRUST AND MEDIA RIGHTS 
HAVE INFLUENCED COLLEGE FOOTBALL  
THOMAS A. BAKER III* & NATASHA T. BRISON** 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that 
so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.  It is still more 
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have  
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind  
imitation of the past.1  
 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s comment concerning use of the doctrine 
of stare decisis has echoed since its first utterance in countless expressions of 
legal scholarship ranging from law reviews to case books.  Recently, this quote 
was reverberated in a speech given by former Justice John Paul Stevens at the 
Sports Lawyers Association’s annual meeting on May 15, 2015.  Justice Stevens 
applied the quote in criticism of the use of stare decisis by the Court in Flood v. 
Kuhn2 to preserve baseball’s antitrust exemption.  Yet, on that same day, the 
Ninth Circuit considered O’Bannon v. NCAA,3 a case that called into question 
the way Justice Stevens applied antitrust law to National Collegiate Athletic 
Association (NCAA) regulations in NCAA v. Board of Regents.4  Justice  
Stevens wrote for the majority in Board of Regents and his holding and dicta in 
                                                          
* Associate Professor of sport law in the Sport Management and Policy Program at the University 
of Georgia. He earned his law degree of from Loyola University of New Orleans and his Ph.D. from 
the University of Florida. 
** Assistant Professor in the Sport Management Division of the College of Education and Human 
Development at Texas A&M University.  Ms. Brison earned two undergraduate degrees from Florida 
State University and a M.S. in Sports Administration from Georgia State University.  She also holds 
a J.D. and a Ph.D. from the University of Georgia. 
1. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Supreme Judicial Court of Mass., Address at the Boston  
University School of Law Dedication: The Path of the Law (Jan. 8, 1897), in 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 
469 (1897). 
2. 407 U.S. 258 (1972). 
3. 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015). 
4. 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
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that case provided a progeny of circuit and district courts with the fodder needed 
to develop a dichotomous application of antitrust to NCAA regulations.  The 
dichotomy involved antitrust scrutiny of NCAA regulations that involved  
commercial activities, but insulated regulations deemed necessary to preserve 
the “revered tradition of amateur[]” athletics.5  The Court’s antitrust analysis 
concerned the NCAA’s television broadcast plan and the limits it imposed on 
college football broadcasts.  Included in the protected regulations were those 
that limited athlete compensation and prohibited athletes from profiting from 
the use of their publicity rights, both of which were at controversy before the 
Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon. 
While the former Justice did not directly address his opinion in Board of 
Regents or the issues in O’Bannon in his speech, his use of Justice Holmes’s 
quote provided the room of lawyers and scholars with fuel for debating the  
fidelity of Justice Stevens’s adherence to his application of antitrust in Board of 
Regents.  Reason for doubt could be found in the way in which he expanded on 
the quote by saying, “I think Justice Holmes would agree that his  
observation is equally applicable to a statement of law - even in one of his own 
opinions - ‘if the grounds upon it was laid down have vanished and the rule 
simply exists from blind imitation of the past.’”6  The statement was based  
upon Justice Holmes’s drafting of the majority opinion in Federal Baseball 
Club v. National League,7 the case that crafted the judicial exemption from  
antitrust law that baseball enjoyed for fifty years prior to Flood.  To Justice  
Stevens, the fact that the exemption had survived for five decades did not  
provide a justification for its continuation, insulating from antitrust law an  
industry that had changed significantly since the ink dried on Holmes’s  
holding.   
Similarly, the commercial industry of college football has transformed  
dramatically since 1984, the year Justice Stevens delivered Board of Regents.  
Most of college football’s economic growth can be attributed to the influx of 
monies flowing from media rights deals made possible by Board of Regents.  
However, none of these new monies have been passed directly into the hands of 
college football players.  The actual athletes for whom the fans flip the dial to 
watch have seen only modest increases in compensation and remain unable to 
profit off of whatever fame the glutton of media attention brings to them.  The 
plaintiffs in O’Bannon tried to change all of that with their antitrust action 
                                                          
5. Id. at 120. 
6. Justice John Paul Stevens, former U.S. Supreme Court Justice, Keynote Address at the Sports 
Lawyers Association 41st Annual Conference Luncheon 15 (May 15, 2015), http://www.su-
premecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/JPS_SportsLawyersAssociation_05-15-15.pdf (quoting Holmes, 
supra note 1). 
7. 259 U.S. 200 (1922). 
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against the NCAA’s restrictions limiting athlete pay and publicity.  In their  
response, the NCAA in O’Bannon relied on Justice Stevens’s dicta in Board of 
Regents by maintaining that the prohibitions were insulated under antitrust law 
as necessary to preserve the product of college football.  
This begs the question: If he had to decide O’Bannon, would Justice Stevens 
side with the NCAA’s reliance on his dicta? Based on his use of Holmes’s quote, 
we are not so sure.  It is our suspicion that Justice Stevens inferred through his 
use of that quote that the grounds upon which Board of Regents were laid have 
long since vanished.  Granted, our reading of subtext into Justice Stevens’s 
speech that day is purely speculative and it would be unfair to both the reader 
and to his honor to assert our speculation as fact.  Still, our suspicion is not 
without basis as it is based in how Federal Baseball Club and Board of Regents 
both concerned sports that underwent dramatic industrialization prior to their 
respective reconsiderations in Flood and O’Bannon.  In the case of Board of  
Regents, added suspicion on our part as to Justice Stevens’s fidelity stems from 
the manner in which the majority opinion and dicta changed college football in 
ways that prompted the plaintiffs to initiate O’Bannon.  
The purpose of this Article is to address the influence of antitrust on the 
current state and future of college football.  To accomplish this purpose, the 
contents of this article include examinations on (1) the influence of the  
dichotomous application of antitrust in Board of Regents on college football and 
(2) the application of antitrust to student-athlete regulation based on O’Bannon.  
The article begins with a reflective analysis of some of the more prominent 
changes caused by the Court’s decision in Board of Regents to strip the NCAA 
of what little control it had over the management of media rights for college 
football television broadcasts.  Following the analysis is a description of the  
manipulations to the market for student-athlete services caused by Justice  
Stevens’s dicta in Board of Regents.  Next, an examination is provided of the 
Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in O’Bannon that refused to recognize a  
quasi-exemption from antitrust law for NCAA regulation of student-athletes.  
The article concludes with a discussion of what may ensue in O’Bannon, if  
anything, and in both Jenkins v. NCAA8 and Alston v. NCAA,9 two antitrust  
actions demanding unlimited compensation for certain classes of  
student-athletes. 
II. BOARD OF REGENTS: HOW THE COURT CHANGED COLLEGE FOOTBALL 
It is both convenient and economical for legal scholars to criticize a  
                                                          
8. 311 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Cal. 2015). 
9. No. 3:14CV01011 (N.D. Cal. filed Mar. 5, 2014). 
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thirty-year-old court decision from the vantage afforded to armchair justices. 
Yet, the past can provide perspective on how matters should be handled going 
forward.  Such is the case with Board of Regents and the challenges to it posed 
by O’Bannon, Jenkins, and Alston. Much has been written on the application of 
law in Board of Regents, but a reexamination of both the decision and the  
dramatic changes to college football that followed is needed.  After all, the  
influence of Board of Regents on the state of college football is still being felt 
in so many different ways.  To understand these changes, let us begin with the 
controversy in the case and the Court’s determinations and proceed from there.  
The Plaintiffs in Board of Regents were a collection of universities with  
big-time football programs who challenged the NCAA’s television plan that 
limited the number of games on national television and the number of times 
each school could be featured on national television.10  The majority held that 
the NCAA’s television plan constituted an unreasonable restraint on trade in 
violation of antitrust law.11  Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, identified 
the NCAA’s plan as a horizontal restraint on trade that prevented individual 
competitors from competing in the market for college football broadcasts.12   
Justice Stevens found that the limits imposed an anticompetitive effect by  
inflating the price paid for broadcasts at the expense of consumer preference for 
more broadcasts.13  Furthermore, Justice Stevens viewed the NCAA’s  
exercise of “complete control” over televised games as more problematic than 
the limits the plan imposed.14  Instead, Justice Stevens aimed to open the market 
for televised college football in a way that the individual member institutions 
that make up the NCAA would each be able to manage their own rights and 
compete for broadcasts in ways that benefited consumers.15  
The NCAA attempted to justify its control in managing media rights for its 
members with the position that the plan was the product of a “joint venture” that 
“assist[ed] in the marketing of broadcast rights. . . .”16  To this end, the Court 
could have aligned the NCAA’s plan with the policy behind Congress’s  
expressed exemption from antitrust law for any joint marketing of rights for 
televising professional sports.17  The Court recognized the professional  
exemption, but in a footnote in Board of Regents, Justice Stevens called  
                                                          
10. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 89, 94. 
11. Id. at 120. 
12. Id. at 98–99. 
13. Id. at 106–07. 
14. Id. at 112. 
15. Id. at 115. 
16. Id. at 113. 
17. See Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961, 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (2016). 
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attention to a district court decision in United States v. NFL18 to support his 
position that an agreement among league members concerning media rights 
could still offend the Sherman Act’s aims.19  Perhaps NFL was not the best fit 
for what would eventually occur in Board of Regents as the court in NFL did 
not strip the league of control over media rights for its members.  Rather, the 
court in NFL limited its intervention to analyzing the reasonableness of the  
specific commercial restraints at controversy.20  
So why did the Court not limit its intervention in Board of Regents to lifting 
the restriction on the number of broadcasts for NCAA members?  Theoretically, 
the Court could have recognized the NCAA’s joint venture justification as  
procompetitive while requiring an increase of output as a less-restrictive  
alternative to the limits under the NCAA’s plan.  For Justice Stevens, however, 
the NCAA’s joint venture justification did not fit because the NCAA was not 
actually a selling agent for its member institutions.21  While the NCAA negoti-
ated with the broadcasters in regards to the collective terms and price for the 
broadcast rights, the NCAA left to the broadcasters and the schools the task of 
selecting games for telecasts.22  The Court found that the NCAA’s role in man-
aging media rights under the plan was that of a limiter, rather than a facilitator, 
of televised broadcasts.23  Thus, the majority viewed the limits on output as the 
sine qua non of the NCAA’s television plan and the extent of the association’s 
cartel control over broadcasting rights for college football.  
In addition to the joint venture position, the NCAA had two other  
procompetitive justifications for preserving the plan that the Court also found 
factually flawed.24  The NCAA’s second justification concerned a purported 
economical threat that increased television broadcasts presented to live  
attendance.25  The flaw the Court found with this position was the fact that the 
NCAA had failed to produce any actual evidence that increasing the number of 
broadcasts and the number of times schools could appear on television would 
dramatically decrease live attendance.26  
                                                          
18. 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Pa. 1953).  In NFL, the district court held that antitrust law did not allow 
the NFL to limit stations from broadcasting games within seventy-five miles of a team not in the match 
while that team was not playing at home and had its game televised by a station within that same  
seventy-five-mile range.  Id. at 326–27. 
19. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 104 n.28.  
20. NFL, 116 F. Supp. at 328–30. 
21. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 113. 
22. Id.  
23. See id. at 113–14. 
24. See id. at 115–20. 
25. Id. at 115. 
26. Id. at 115–16. 
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For its third and final justification, the NCAA argued that the limits on 
broadcasts and appearances in its plan were necessary to maintain competitive 
balance among its football programs.27  In dealing with this justification, the 
Court first recognized the necessity for “a certain degree of cooperation” for 
sport that distinguishes it from other types of industries.28  This makes sense in 
that the market for soft drinks is not dependent on the establishment of controls 
as to how Coca-Cola and Pepsi compete; and Coca-Cola does not need Pepsi in 
order to make its beverage.  Conversely, the University of Georgia needs the 
University of Florida in order to hold its annual rivalry game in Jacksonville, 
Florida.  The University of Oklahoma needs the University of Texas to have the 
“Red River Showdown” game every year at the Cotton Bowl in Dallas, Texas.  
For those games, and all of college football to function, the Court found that 
some horizontal restraints are necessary through the formation of regulatory 
controls governing competition.29  The Court also recognized that controls of 
this nature are “procompetitive because they enhance [the] public[’s] interest in 
intercollegiate athletics.”30  The problem for the NCAA was that restraints on 
telecasts did not “fit into the same mold [of] rules defining the conditions of the 
contest.”31 
Possibly the bigger issue with the NCAA’s competitive balance justification 
was that the restraints did not actually result in competitive balance.  In fact, 
“The NCAA [did] not claim that its television plan ha[d] equalized [(or even 
attempted to equalize)] competition” among its members.32  The Court noted 
that while the NCAA’s plan was nationwide, there was “no single league or 
tournament” for Division I college football.33  The television plan was not even 
tailored to result in competitive balance as there was no regulation on the 
amount of money that schools could spend on their football programs or the 
ways in which schools could use revenues generated from television broadcasts, 
ticket sales, concessions, or sponsorships.34  Furthermore, the Court found that 
there was “no evidence that [the restraints imposed by the NCAA’s television 
plan] produce[d] any greater measure of equality throughout the NCAA than 
would a restriction on alumni donations, tuition rates, or any other revenue-pro-
ducing activity.”35 
                                                          
27. Id. at 117. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. Id. at 117–18. 
33. Id. at 118. 
34. Id. at 119. 
35. Id. 
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While all of that was true, Justice Stevens and the majority missed the mark 
on one key component, perhaps the most important component and one that 
framed an underlying battle taking place in Board of Regents.  The mistake 
made by the Court was in its position that the plan was not aimed at protecting 
the competitive power of “any readily identifiable group of competitors.”36  
While it is possible the NCAA did not properly present a class of competitors 
that needed protecting via the plan, a vulnerable population of member schools 
most certainly existed.  To locate that class of competitors, the Court needed 
only to look to all Division I football programs that were not part of the class of  
plaintiffs. After all, those were the football programs that stood to lose from the 
Court lifting the limits on college football television broadcasts.  Supporting this 
position is the fact that the class of complainants was not the programs that were 
never featured in broadcasts via the NCAA’s television plan; the class consisted 
of the programs that were featured the most.37 
Joining the Universities of Oklahoma and Georgia as plaintiffs were a  
collection of sixty-four college football programs known as the College Football 
Association (CFA).  These schools represented the “haves” of college football, 
those with lucrative programs that were members of the major athletic  
conferences and/or enjoyed automatic access to the postseason bowls with the 
largest payouts.  These were the programs that wanted more broadcasts and  
revenues for their rank.  On the other side of the aisle was the NCAA, which 
represented the interests for all of its members in Division I, not just those with 
the most successful football programs.  Thus, another way of viewing Board of 
Regents was as a battle between the “haves” and “have-nots” of college football, 
with the Plaintiffs playing the role of the haves and the NCAA serving as the 
representative for and defender of the have-nots.  
Unfortunately, the actual battle between the proverbial haves and have-nots 
of college football was probably well on its way to being lost prior to the first 
filing in Board of Regents because the television plan at controversy did not 
provide for equitable revenue sharing across the Football Bowl Subdivision 
(FBS).38  Had that been the case, then perhaps the Court’s perception of the facts 
would have supported the provision of an exemption from antitrust law for the 
NCAA’s television plan based on the reasons Congress relied on in exempting 
from antitrust law media-rights management for professional sports.39  Instead, 
                                                          
36. Id. at 118. 
37. John J. Siegfried & Molly Gardner Burba, The College Football Association Television  
Broadcast Cartel, 49 ANTITRUST BULL. 799, 802 (2004). 
38. See infra note 71. 
39. Justice Stevens noted that the NCAA failed to provide evidence that its plan “produce[d] any 
greater measure of equality throughout the NCAA than would a restriction on alumni donations, tuition 
rates, or any other revenue-producing activity.” Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 119. 
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the television restraints at issue in Board of Regents merely prevented the  
exacerbation of an already existing disparity in big-time college football.  After 
all, college football’s have-nots were already disadvantaged by their lack of  
access to the payouts provided by the premier bowl games and in the disparity 
existing in the profits pulled from attendance, sponsorship, and alumni  
donations.  
Justice Stevens and the majority should have better appreciated their  
position in relation to this tug-of-war between the haves and have-nots of  
college football.  By stripping the NCAA of regulatory control over  
media-rights management, the Court injected itself into the fray and drastically 
disturbed the balance of power in favor of the haves.  The in-fighting at issue in 
Board of Regents was a type of organizational instability that, in the authors’ 
view, is best left for internal resolution rather than judicial intervention.  Not 
only that, but the majority was mistaken as to the NCAA’s role in managing 
college football media rights for its members—a mistake that was caught in the 
dissent written by Justice White, with whom Justice Rehnquist joined.   
III. THE COURT’S MISTAKE AND HOW BOARD OF REGENTS SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN RESOLVED  
The dissent recognized that the NCAA’s role via the plan extended beyond 
limiting broadcasts.  Specifically, the dissent took a practical and realistic view 
of how broadcast rights for football games were (and still are) actually  
negotiated and sold within the “competitive market[place].”40  And under the 
plan at controversy, the NCAA packaged the broadcast rights for its football-
playing members and negotiated the “real . . . price and terms” of the television 
deals with broadcasters.41  “The selection[s] of games to . . . broadcast w[ere] 
left to the networks” to negotiate with the individual schools “to maximize the 
value of [broadcasts].”42  While the NCAA did not take a hands-on role in  
working with member schools and broadcasters in selecting and managing  
individual game telecasts, that fact did not trivialize the NCAA’s function in 
creating the plan.  Hence, the Court used a heavy-handed application of antitrust 
in meeting consumer interest in more broadcasts.  The Court could have, and 
arguably should have, preserved the NCAA’s cartel control over media rights 
as a joint venture similar to the NFL’s management of rights for its franchises.  
The justifications for exempting the NFL’s cartel control over broadcast rights 
provided a basis for finding a procompetitive purpose for the NCAA’s cartel 
control.  In NFL, the court recognized: 
                                                          
40. Id. at 127–28 (White, J., dissenting). 
41. Id. 
42. Siegfried & Burba, supra note 37, at 801. 
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the teams should not compete too strongly with each other in a 
business way. The evidence shows that in the National  
Football League less than half the clubs over a period of years 
are likely to be financially successful. . . . Under these  
circumstances it is both wise and essential that rules be passed 
to help the weaker clubs in their competition with the stronger 
ones and to keep the League in fairly even balance.43  
 
The court in NFL went on to find that one way that professional sport 
leagues could protect competitive balance on the field is to limit competition off 
the field through restrictions imposed on television broadcasts.44  The  
procompetitive justifications for joint venture management of media rights in 
NFL can be easily applied to the facts at issue in Board of Regents.  And while 
it is true that the court in NFL still found that the specific limitations imposed 
by the NFL’s plan were illegal under the Sherman Act,45 the court did not go as 
far as to strip the league completely of its cartel control over broadcasts.46   
Furthermore, the controversial decision in NFL was the primary catalyst for 
Congress’s exempting league control over broadcasts with the Sports  
Broadcasting Act of 1961.47  The Act expressly exempts from antitrust law the 
sale of a television package consisting of broadcast rights by professional sports 
leagues.48  With the need to protect the NCAA’s weaker programs in mind, the 
Court, in Board of Regents, also could have left unchecked the NCAA’s  
authority over the plan while also advancing consumer welfare by holding that 
the specific restrictions on broadcast output in the plan violated antitrust law. 
By limiting its reach to the broadcast output, the Court would have narrowly 
tailored its application of antitrust law and drastically reduced the case’s impact 
on the battle between the haves and have-nots for control over college football—
allowing the bigger conflict to play out within the organization rather than 
within the halls of the Supreme Court building.  This approach would have been 
more deferential to the NCAA.  Also, the limited approach would have allowed 
the NCAA to still look out for the have-nots by negotiating terms that included 
mandatory broadcasts for less-prominent schools, thereby maintaining some 
 degree of revenue sharing through the plan.  Additionally, preservation of the 
                                                          
43. United States v. NFL, 116 F. Supp. 319, 323 (E.D. Pa. 1953). 
44. Id. at 324. 
45. Id. at 330. 
46. Id. at 326. 
47. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291–1295 (2016). 
48. Id. § 1291. 
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plan would have left intact a foundation that possibly (even if unlikely) could 
have led to increased management by the NCAA, and this could have resulted 
in more meaningful sharing of media revenue among the member institutions.  
As previously stated, the battle may have already been lost for the have-nots, 
and it is possible that the CFA schools would have eventually wrangled away 
more control from the NCAA internally, or left the NCAA and formed a new 
association.  Yet, whatever would have happened following a narrowly tailored 
Board of Regents would have happened organically.  
Justice Stevens’s heavy-handed approach in Board of Regents did more than 
just end the NCAA’s control over media management for its members; the  
decision set in motion a series of acts that eventually shifted the control over 
media-rights management of football from the NCAA to the conferences.49  
Justice Stevens and the majority may have used Board of Regents to open up a 
market in which individual institutions would compete for the benefit of  
consumers,50 but that is not exactly what happened.  While a few individual 
schools manage all three tiers of their media rights,51 most have deferred  
media-rights management to their respective conferences.52  By ending the 
NCAA’s cartel control over managing broadcast rights for all of its institutions, 
Board of Regents effectively replaced the NCAA with the CFA, which  
controlled broadcasting rights for only its members and excluded all non-CFA 
programs from sharing in the pot.53  The CFA’s cartel control, however, was 
subsequently limited by another antitrust action in Regents of the University of 
California v. American Broadcasting Cos. (ABC Sports).54  In ABC Sports, the 
Ninth Circuit tracked the Court’s reasoning in Board of Regents and found that 
antitrust law would not allow the CFA’s exclusive deal with ABC to block  
Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) and National Broadcasting Company 
(NBC) from broadcasting University of Notre Dame and Pacific-10 Conference 
(Pac-10) games.55  Following ABC Sports, the CFA managed media rights for 
its original members sans Notre Dame and the Pac-10. But in 1995, the CFA 
lost cartel control and ceased to exist when the SEC and Big East decided to 
                                                          
49. See Alfred Dennis Mathewson, The Bowl Championship Series, Conference Realignment and 
the Major College Football Oligopoly: Revolution Not Reform, 1 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 321, 334 
(2012). 
50. Justice Stevens criticized the NCAA’s plan in Board of Regents because “[n]o individual school 
[was] free to televise its own games without restraint.”  NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 115 
(1984). 
51. Such as Notre Dame, Brigham Young, Army, and Texas.  
52. See Mathewson, supra note 49. 
53. Id. 
54. 747 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1984). 
55. See id. at 521. 
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manage their respective media rights.56  
Accordingly, Board of Regents did not accomplish Justice Stevens’s  
vision of media-rights management at the institution/program level.  In fact, 
very few FBS programs manage all three tiers of their media rights.57  The  
dissent was correct: the competitive marketplace for college football broadcasts  
necessitates the collective packaging of rights.58  Looking at what is happening 
today, instead of league-wide cartel control at the NCAA level, college football 
broadcast rights are controlled by a small number of mini-cartels at the  
conference level.  The shift from NCAA management of media rights to  
conference management that resulted from Board of Regents set in motion a 
tectonic shift in power that would reshape college athletics, not just football. 
IV. THE FALLOUT RESULTING FROM BOARD OF REGENTS 
Today, college football consists of mid-major programs (less prestigious 
programs that form the “Group of 5”)59 and a group of conferences that are 
collectively called the Power 5 (P5).60  The P5 includes the Atlantic Coast  
Conference (ACC), Big Ten Conference (Big Ten), Big 12 Conference (Big 12), 
Pacific-12 Conference (Pac-12), and Southeastern Conference (SEC), and  
represents the most powerful football programs in the FBS.61  The P5  
conferences are also those with the most lucrative television contracts—some 
even have their own networks.62  However, it is important to note that not all 
members of the P5 are power programs in terms of their competitive  
contributions to the actual sport of college football.  The schools within the P5 
are fortunate enough to have historical ties to conferences that include  
prominent and very successful programs.  The arbitrariness of conference  
affiliation in P5 conferences has proved harmful to many successful football 
programs that found themselves on the outside looking in, while less successful 
football programs within the P5 have reaped financial benefits from shared  
                                                          
56. See Mathewson, supra note 49, at 334–35. 
57. Our research found that only Notre Dame and Brigham Young control their media rights and 
both are not full participating members of any athletic conference (for all sports).  
58. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 128 (1984) (White, J., dissenting). 
59. The Group of Five consists of the American Athletic Conference, Conference USA, the  
Mid-American Conference, the Mountain West Conference, and the Sun Belt Conference.  Bill Bender, 
Power 5 vs. Group of 5: College Football’s Split Decision, SPORTING NEWS (June 9, 2014), 
http://www.sportingnews.com/ncaa-football-news/4589827-power-5-conferences-autonomy-ncaa-
group-of-5-nick-saban-mike-slive-division-iv-split. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Some conferences with their own networks are the SEC Network, the Pac-12 Network, and the 
Big Ten Network. 
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media-rights revenues derived from conference affiliations.  
The P5 conferences were reshaped based on conference realignment from 
their original formations (mostly based on historical alliances) in the 1990s and 
throughout the 2000s.  Board of Regents was a catalyst for conference  
realignment because the process was fueled by conferences desiring the  
acquisition of new, large media markets in order to secure bigger and better 
media deals.63  Conferences cannibalized each other through realignment with 
major conferences raiding other major, and even mid-major, conferences for 
new members for new media markets.  The transition was not orderly, and the 
mass movement of programs from one league to another caused one league to 
close shop (Southwest Conference) and several others to drop football (Big East 
Conference, Big West Conference, and Western Athletic Conference).  In vain 
efforts to remain relevant in football, two conferences and two members from 
realignment-affected leagues actually sued departing members.64  When the 
dust had settled, for the time being, realignment had transformed the most  
prominent football conferences from eight ten-member regional leagues with 
schools in relative proximity to each other to twelve fourteen-member goliaths 
with geographic reaches that stretched across the country.  
In Board of Regents, Justice Stevens recognized that antitrust is a  
mechanism for “consumer welfare prescription,”65 but that conference  
realignment harmed college football consumers because it (1) made travel for 
road games difficult by increasing the distance between schools and (2)  
eradicated many longstanding annual rivalry series by separating rival programs 
into different leagues.66  Furthermore, Board of Regents did not protect  
consumers of mid-major football programs as their favorite schools found  
themselves unable to financially compete with P5 schools for top talent.   
Compounding that problem is the fact that mid-majors make up almost half of 
the FBS.  
                                                          
63. Ronald A. Smith, Intercollegiate Athletic Associations and Conferences, in SPORTS IN AMERICA 
FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Steven A. Riess ed., 2015). 
64. Christian Dennie, Conference Realignment: From Backyard Brawls to Cash Cows, 1 MISS. 
SPORTS L. REV. 249, 257–64 (2012). 
65. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 
330, 343 (1979)). 
66. Dennie, supra note 64, at 278; see also Conference Realignment Poll, BAYLOR U., 
http://www.baylor.edu/survey/ (last visited June 9, 2016) (showing the results of a survey revealing that 
76% of alumni polled preferred traditional rivalries between schools in close proximity to each other 
over those resulting from conference realignment that creates super conferences); Cody T. Havard & 
Terry Eddy, Qualitative Assessment of Rivalry and Conference Realignment in Intercollegiate  
Athletics, 6 J. ISSUES INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 216, 222–27 (2013) (noting a study that  
empirically examined the harm caused to consumers of college football by studying fan reaction to loss 
of traditional rivalry games based on conference realignment).  
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Unfortunately for the mid-majors, the management of media rights for  
college football’s postseason also produced substantial inequity.  Almost since 
its inception, college football’s postseason has been managed by the bowls, 
games produced by bowl committees that pit teams from different leagues 
against each other in a number of mini-championships.67  The national  
champion of college football, however, was decided by various polls that often 
produced conflicting results by crowning different champions.68  In the early 
1990s, the most prominent conferences pulled together with the most powerful 
bowl committees and interested television networks to coordinate college  
football’s postseason in a way that would result in the crowning of a  
champion.69  With no control over regular season broadcast rights or postseason 
bowl games and their broadcast rights, the NCAA had no place at the table in 
these discussions.  Emerging from this unholy alliance of commercially-driven 
partners was an entity that would grow into the nefarious Bowl Championship 
Series (BCS).70 The NCAA manages the playoffs for its football-playing  
members in divisions below what was once called Division I-A71 but does not 
manage the playoff for its premier college football division.  
Before the advent of the playoff for the FBS division, the BCS decided who 
would play in the national title game for sixteen years72 and the damage it did 
to college football is lasting, and likely permanent. The BCS effectively divided 
programs in the premier subdivision of college football into BCS  
programs and non-BCS programs; the non-BCS programs were the mid-major 
programs.73 The BCS schools were those in the premier athletic conferences 
(composed mostly of former CFA programs) that enjoyed automatic access for 
league champions into BCS Bowls (i.e., the premier bowls represented in the 
BCS format).74 But more importantly, the BCS schools were also those that 
                                                          
67. Jodi M. Warmbrod, Comment, Antitrust in Amateur Athletics: Fourth and Long: Why Non-BCS  
Universities Should Punt Rather than Go for an Antitrust Challenge to the Bowl Championship Series, 
57 OKLA. L. REV. 333, 336–39 (2004). 
68. Id. at 338–39. 
69. C. Paul Rogers III, The Quest for Number One in College Football: The Revised Bowl  
Championship Series, Antitrust, and the Winner Take All Syndrome, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 285, 
286–87 (2008). 
70. Id. (noting that what would become the BCS was first called the Bowl Coalition and then called 
the Bowl Alliance before changing to the BCS). 
71. Division I-A is now called the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS).  Divisional Differences and 
the History of Multidivision Classification, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/mem-
bership/divisional-differences-and-history-multidivision-classification (last visited June 9, 2016). 
72. See Jude D. Schmit, A Fresh Set of Downs? Why Recent Modifications to the Bowl  
Championship Series Still Draw a Flag Under the Sherman Act, 14 SPORTS LAW. J. 219, 229–30 
(2007). 
73. Rogers, supra note 69, at 287–88. 
74. Id. at 288–89. 
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automatically shared in the television revenues generated by the package and 
sale of the rights to televise the BCS bowl games.75 It took the threat of antitrust 
litigation for mid-major programs to gain limited access to the BCS, which  
allowed the few accessing programs to financially benefit.76 Yet, from its  
inception to its folding, no mid-major program was ever selected to play in the 
BCS Championship program. The lack of financial benefits associated with the 
BCS and the distinction as mid-major were two key variables that made it  
virtually impossible for mid-major programs to compete with BCS schools for 
college football recruits.77  
The truth is that competitive equity never existed in college football, and it 
is highly possible that the landscape of college football would have eventually 
been reshaped no matter the result in Board of Regents.  It is also true that Board 
of Regents set into motion the events that changed college football in ways that 
harmed consumers, particularly the fans of mid-major programs.78  In fact, the 
term “mid-major” did not exist prior to the infusion of commercialization 
through increased media exposure and media-generated revenues made possible 
by Board of Regents.  Thus, no matter what happens in O’Bannon, a lasting 
legacy will remain from Board of Regents in the great disparity in power and 
financial resources that now exist between the haves and have-nots of college 
football.79  These disparities were caused because the Court took a side in the 
battle for control over college football media-rights management, and a strong 
case could be made that the Court chose the wrong side. 
V. JUSTICE STEVENS’S DICTA AND THE MANIPULATED MARKET FOR 
COLLEGE ATHLETES 
Justice Stevens was right about one key fact in his decision in Board of 
Regents: consumers wanted substantially more televised college football than 
the NCAA’s plan provided.  It took a bit of time, but in the wake of Board of 
                                                          
75. Id. (noting that the BCS “guaranteed almost $1 million” to each BCS school while all others 
were  
“receiv[ing] as little as $180,000 before expenses”). 
76. Schmit, supra note 72, at 234. 
77. See Craig A. Depken II & Dennis P. Wilson, Institutional Change in the NCAA and Competitive  
Balance in Intercollegiate Football, in ECONOMICS OF COLLEGE SPORTS 197, 197–209 (John Fizel &  
Rodney Fort eds., 2004) (highlighting a study using both the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and  
Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) measures to examine the influence of regulatory changes on  
competitive balance in college football between 1888-2001 found that the BCS, in just four seasons, 
had a negative effect on competitive balance using the SCP measure). 
78. See generally Brian Goff, College Football ‘Mid Majors’ Face Uncertain Future, FORBES (Sept. 
1, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/briangoff/2014/09/01/college-football-mid-majors-face-uncer-
tain-future/. 
79. See Depken & Wilson, supra note 77.  
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Regents, college football has ballooned into an industry worth billions of  
dollars, in large part due to the monies mined from the leverage of media 
rights.80  The gross commercialization resulting from the influx of media  
money has led former University of Texas football coach Mack Brown to  
believe, “College football is growing closer and closer to being like the 
N.F.L.”81  The industrial growth of NCAA football has also increased the  
competition for college-athlete services and the spending needed to attract them 
to campus.  Yet, the athletes, the most necessary of inputs for the product of 
college football,82 have not financially benefited from the gross increases in 
spending on their sports.  Since 1973, NCAA “amateurism” regulations have 
capped athlete compensation at roughly the same rate, covering only tuition, 
books, and room and board.83  Only recently, starting August 1, 2015, has  
grant-in-aid seen an increase by way of an option for programs to extend athlete 
compensation to include costs of attendance for each school.84  The push for 
this extension was in response to O’Bannon and other antitrust actions lodged 
against the NCAA.85  While a step in the right direction, a cost of attendance 
allowance is just a mere extension of the existing cap on student-athlete  
compensation—one that is not calculated based on revenue.86 
Still, the cap on student-athlete compensation has not slowed competition 
for athlete services.  Instead, the cap has allowed for the inflation of an “arm’s 
race” in which NCAA member institutions compete for college athletes by 
spending on the best coaches and building preposterously lavish facilities.87  
The distorted marketplace for college-athlete services resulting from Board of  
                                                          
80. ESPN has agreed to pay $7.3 billion over twelve years for the rights to televise seven playoff 
games per year.  Based on revenues from this new playoff system, the P5 conferences saw increases in 
base revenues from $28 million in 2013–2014 to about $50 million in 2014–2015, further adding to the 
income disparity between the P5 and the Group of 5.  Marc Tracy & Tim Rohan, What Made College 
Football More Like the Pros? $7.3 Billion, for a Start, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2014), http://www.ny-
times.com/2014/12/31/sports/ncaafootball/what-made-college-ball-more-like-the-pros-73-billion-for-
a-start.html?_r=0. 
81. Id. 
82. In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1150 (W.D. Wash. 
2005). 
83. Mark Snyder, The NCAA’s Grant in Aid Cap: Injustice Forced on Student-Athletes 5 (2015)  
(unpublished comment, Seton Hall University Law School Student Scholarship), http://scholar-
ship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1695&context=student_scholarship. 
84. Steve Berkowitz & Andrew Kreighbaum, College Athletes Cashing in with Millions in New 
Benefits, USA TODAY (Aug. 19, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/college/2015/ 
08/18/ncaa-cost-attendance-meals-2015/31904839/. 
85. Id. 
86. See id. 
87. Brian Bennett, Arms Race Proves Recession-Proof, ESPN (June 14, 2012), 
http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/8047787/college-football-facilities-arms-race-proves-
recession-proof. 
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Regents matches predictions made for the market for assistant coaches in Law 
v. NCAA.88  In Law, the Tenth Circuit anticipated that a cap on coach pay would 
not control the constantly spiraling costs for college athletics, as schools would 
merely find other things on which to spend in competition against each other.89  
The Tenth Circuit’s predictions of how a cap on compensation imposed by 
NCAA regulations would result in schools redirecting rather than limiting 
spending proved true, but to the detriment of student-athletes rather than 
coaches.  The redirection of monies at the expense of athletes can be blamed, in 
part at least, on the influence of dicta in Board of Regents, which provided  
federal district and circuit courts with the cover needed to insulate from antitrust 
law the NCAA’s regulation of athlete compensation.  
Student-athlete regulation was not even before the Court, yet Justice  
Stevens addressed the subject with several statements in dicta, including one 
providing that the NCAA “need[ed] ample latitude” in preserving the “revered 
tradition of amateurism.”90  Included in Justice Stevens’s latitude were athlete 
regulations that prevent athletes from being paid because he deemed them  
necessary for protecting consumer interest in safeguarding college football as a 
product distinct from professional football.91  Following Board of Regents, a 
number of district courts and appellate circuits relied on Justice Stevens’s dicta 
in fashioning an application of antitrust law that shielded from review all  
regulation of college athletes.  Most did so by refusing to recognize a relevant 
market for athlete services based on the distinction Justice Stevens drew  
between amateur and professional football.92  
In spite of this, there has been a shift in the conceptual framework as to how 
antitrust applies (or does not) to NCAA student-athlete regulations, and this 
shift emerged from the Ninth Circuit in Tanaka v. University of Southern  
California.93  In Tanaka, a soccer player at the University of Southern  
California challenged a Pac-10 transfer rule that required her to sit out one full 
year prior to her playing for the University of California, Los Angeles on the 
grounds that the rule violated antitrust laws.94  At first blush, the fact that the 
                                                          
88. 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998). 
89. Id. at 1023. 
90. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984). 
91. Id. at 101–02. 
92. Thomas A. Baker III, Joel G. Maxcy & Cyntrice Thomas, White v. NCAA: A Chink in the 
Antitrust Armor, 21 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 75, 91 (2011); see also Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 
185–86 (3d Cir. 1998); Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1093 (7th Cir. 1992); McCormack v. NCAA, 
845 F.2d 1338, 1344 (5th Cir. 1988); Pocono Invitational Sports Camp, Inc. v. NCAA, 317 F. Supp. 2d 
569, 587 (E.D. Pa. 2004); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 745 (M.D. Tenn. 1990).  
93. 252 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2001). 
94. Id. at 1061–62. 
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Ninth Circuit in Tanaka held that the Plaintiff failed to establish a relevant  
market for her services95 seems to match the trend of courts refusing to  
recognize relevant markets for student-athletes following Board of Regents.  A 
closer look, however, reveals that the Ninth Circuit in Tanaka actually  
recognized that relevant product and geographic markets might exist for  
student-athlete services, but the Plaintiff erred in establishing a relevant  
market by restricting the reach of her product and geographic markets to a  
single program and the reach of her anticompetitive effect to herself.96  The 
Ninth Circuit, in Tanaka, left open the possibility that a larger relevant market 
exists in the competition for student-athlete services on a regional or national 
level. In fact, the court actually found that the Pac-10 provided the Plaintiff in 
Tanaka with a definable relevant product market based on the fact that she was 
actively recruited by a number of schools within the league.97  
The shift in approach continued just four years later with a district court 
decision, also out of the Ninth Circuit.  In re NCAA 1-A Walk-On Football  
Players Litigation (Walk-On Football Players) concerned an antitrust challenge 
to NCAA scholarship restrictions that prevented walk-on players from receiving 
athletics-based financial aid.98  The court in Walk-On Football Players looked 
to the Tenth Circuit’s reasoning in Law to find that the market for  
student-athletes was not unlike the market the Tenth Circuit recognized for  
assistant coaches.99  To show a relevant market, plaintiffs must be able to  
establish reasonable product interchangeability and cross-price elasticity.100  
The court in Walk-On Football Players found that those two requirements were 
met by the Plaintiffs’ proof that a dearth of viable substitutes existed for  
student-athletes who desired to compete at the highest level of competition in 
amateur football.101  
Following Walk-On Football Players was White v. NCAA,102 which was the 
first plausible and well-crafted antitrust attack on the NCAA regulations that 
limit student-athlete compensation.  The plausibility in White was found in how 
the Plaintiffs did not attempt to defeat or dismiss the “preservation of  
amateurism” justification, and the smart crafting was found in how the  
Plaintiffs proffered their relevant market.  The Plaintiffs in White understood 
                                                          
95. Id. at 1063–64. 
96. Id. at 1065. 
97. Id. at 1063–64. 
98. In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig.,398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1146–47 (W.D. Wash. 
2005). 
99. Id. at 1150. 
100. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394–95 (1956). 
101. Walk-On Football Players, 398 F. Supp. 2d at 1150. 
102. White v. NCAA, No. CV 06-999-RGK (MANx), 2006 WL 8066802 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2006). 
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the uphill battle they would face if they were to wage an attempt at reversing  
decades of decisions that relied on Justice Stevens’s call for ample latitude in 
preserving amateurism at their expense.103  The Plaintiffs were modest in their 
demand and sought incremental gains rather than full-scale assault on the ample 
latitude that Justice Stevens believed the NCAA needed in preserving  
amateurism.104  Specifically, the plaintiffs in White did not challenge the 
NCAA’s authority in enforcing a cap on athlete compensation under the  
antitrust laws.  Instead, the Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims challenged the artificiality 
of the grant-in-aid calculation because it did not cover the full cost of  
attendance.105  
Turning next to their relevant market, the plaintiffs in White carefully  
proffered markets, both in the NCAA’s Division I, consisting of (1) major  
college football programs and (2) major college basketball programs.106  In  
support of these two markets, the plaintiffs asserted that no reasonably  
interchangeable substitutes existed for the would-be student-athletes who  
desired the unique mix of academics and athletics offered at Division I’s highest 
levels for each sport.107  Note that the markets identified in their complaint 
placed the plaintiffs in the position of buyers rather than sellers—the necessary 
“inputs” for making the product as acknowledged in Walk-On Football  
Players.108  By framing the markets in this manner, the Plaintiffs allowed the 
court in White to recognize relevant markets within these sports without having 
to make determinations on the markets for college athlete services.  The 
thoughtful pleading paid off for the Plaintiffs because the court in White denied 
the NCAA’s motion to dismiss and in doing so held that the Plaintiffs’ relevant 
market was legally sufficient to survive judgment as a matter of law.109 Mere 
months later, the NCAA settled the case with the Plaintiffs in White for $10 
million.110  While the case did not proceed to verdict and no precedent was set, 
                                                          
103. See generally Second Amended Complaint for Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1, White v. NCAA, No. CV 06-0999-RGK (MANx) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2006), 
http://www.ncaaclassaction.com/complaint.pdf. 
104. Baker, Maxcy & Thomas, supra note 92, at 95. 
105. Second Amended Complaint for Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, 
supra note 103, at 6. 
106. Id. at 10–11. 
107. Id. at 11–13. 
108. In re NCAA I-A Walk-On Football Players Litig., 398 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1150 (W.D. Wash. 
2005). 
109. White v. NCAA, No. CV 06-0999-RGK (MANx), 2006 WL 8066802, at *2–4 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 
21, 2006). 
110. Stipulation and Agreement of Settlement Between Plaintiffs and Defendant NCAA, White v. 
NCAA, No. CV06-0999 VBF (MANx), 2008 WL 890625, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2008).  The $10 
million was for distribution on a claims-made basis, and the settlement required that students have 
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the Plaintiffs in White set the stage for what would come in O’Bannon and  
provided the plaintiffs in O’Bannon with an antitrust roadmap for attacking the 
NCAA’s compensation cap in a way that would work around Justice Stevens’s 
dicta in Board of Regents.111 
VI. O’BANNON V. NCAA: THE NINTH CIRCUIT TACKLES BOARD OF REGENTS 
On September 30, 2015, the Ninth Circuit addressed arguments in  
O’Bannon that were very similar to those presented in White and held that the 
NCAA’s amateurism rules are not exempt from the rule of reason analysis  
under antitrust law.112  The Ninth Circuit’s order affirmed, in part,113 a district 
court decision that held that the NCAA’s amateurism provisions violated § 1 of 
the Sherman Antitrust Act.114  This section of the Article will summarize the 
specifics of the Ninth Circuit’s decision that effectively ended, for now, the 
quasi-antitrust exemption for NCAA amateurism regulations that emerged from 
Justice Stevens’s dicta in Board of Regents.  
A. First Down: No Quasi-Exemption Exists for Amateurism Rules 
For its first order of business, the Ninth Circuit quickly put to rest the  
notion that the NCAA amateurism rules were “valid as a matter of law.”115  In 
its appeal, the NCAA argued Board of Regents held that rules relating to the 
amateur aspects of college athletics were “presumptively valid.”116  In support 
of its position of a quasi-exemption for its regulation of student-athletes, the 
NCAA relied on three decisions from the Ninth Circuit’s “sister circuits” in 
Smith v. NCAA, McCormack v. NCAA, and Agnew v. NCAA.117  The NCAA was 
not misguided in relying on these three decisions because all three relied on 
Justice Stevens’s dicta in fortifying the NCAA’s amateurism restrictions from 
antitrust review. Oddly, the Ninth Circuit singled out Agnew as the only one 
from the three that came “close to agreeing with the NCAA’s interpretation of 
Board of Regents.”118  
What is odd about that finding is that Smith clearly stands for the position 
that the NCAA’s student-athlete regulations were immune to the antitrust laws.  
                                                          
access to another $218 million that existed within a slush fund used to fund student expenses.  Id. 
111. Baker, Maxcy & Thomas, supra note 92, at 94. 
112. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1063 (9th Cir. 2015). 
113. Id. at 1079. 
114. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
115. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1061–64. 
116. Id. at 1063. 
117. Id. at 1064. 
118. Id. 
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In Smith, the Third Circuit held that the NCAA’s eligibility rules were not  
commercial or business activities because they did not confer to the NCAA a 
commercial advantage.119 The Ninth Circuit recognized this holding in  
O’Bannon.120  But what the Ninth Circuit neglected was the Third Circuit’s  
finding in Smith that even if the regulation at issue was viewed by the court to 
be economics-driven, the court would have still held it to be noncommercial 
because it furthered the NCAA’s procompetitive goals of fair competition and 
the survival of intercollegiate athletics.121  In fact, in Agnew, the Seventh  
Circuit looked to Smith as providing a definitive determination that, within the 
Third Circuit, the NCAA’s eligibility regulations were not commercial and, 
therefore, outside of the Sherman Act’s reach.122  Further, the Seventh Circuit 
in Agnew diverted from Smith’s definitive holding and instead found that the  
antitrust laws apply generally to the NCAA’s Bylaws.123  For the court in  
Agnew, the application of antitrust to NCAA regulations turned on the  
commerciality of any specific NCAA Bylaw based on a relevant market  
analysis.124  This position was in stark contrast to that taken by the same circuit 
in Banks v. NCAA.125  In Banks, the Seventh Circuit held that the NCAA’s  
no-draft rule was incapable of restraining trade in the marketplace for college 
football players “because the NCAA does not exist as a minor league training 
ground for future NFL players. . . .”126  Thus, Agnew was a small step forward 
from Banks for student-athlete plaintiffs, and most definitely did not provide the 
NCAA with a blanket per se presumption of validity, even though the Seventh 
Circuit was not ready to recognize either a relevant education or labor market 
existing within NCAA college athletics.  
What the Ninth Circuit did next was also curious; it took the NCAA’s bait 
by distinguishing between the per se presumption of validity position and the 
NCAA’s argument that its Bylaws were not commercial.  This was curious  
because the Ninth Circuit had no need to distinguish between the per se validity 
and the commerciality arguments.  After all, the fundamental reason that  
decades of decisions had exempted NCAA Bylaws from antitrust review was 
due to the fact that the regulations were found to be noncommercial based on 
Justice Stevens’s dicta in Board of Regents.  Thus, the two positions were  
connected rather than distinguishable, and the Ninth Circuit could have (and 
                                                          
119. Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 1998). 
120. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1065. 
121. Smith, 139 F.3d at 186. 
122. Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 339 (7th Cir. 2012). 
123. Id. at 340. 
124. Id. 
125. 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992). 
126. Id. at 1089–90. 
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arguably should have) treated them as such.  
The reason why the Ninth Circuit probably should have addressed these  
positions in one fell swoop, rather than independently, is found in how the court 
countered the NCAA’s noncommercial position. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit 
distinguished the compensation rules in O’Bannon from the regulations at issue 
in Smith and Bassett v. NCAA,127 respectively.128  The problem with this  
approach is that it gave credence to the existence of the per se validity provided 
by the dichotomous approach (which exempted NCAA Bylaws as  
noncommercial) and required the court to engage in a level of analysis that is 
not required under the rule of reason.  Particularly, by distinguishing the  
compensation requirements as commercial, in comparison to the  
noncommercial regulations at issue in Smith and Bassett, the Ninth Circuit  
satisfied a “commerciality” step that is not required under the rule of reason 
analysis.  Instead, the court in O’Bannon should have simply recognized the  
applicability of the Sherman Act to the NCAA’s Bylaws and then followed the 
approach taken in Agnew by addressing the commercial nature of the  
compensation caps through relevant market analysis. 
So why did the Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon go to such exhaustive lengths in 
countering the NCAA’s confounding arguments on the applicability of the  
antitrust laws to its amateurism regulations?  It is possible that the Ninth  
Circuit was just being thorough.  Or perhaps the court’s complex and tedious 
analysis was, in part at least, an act of deference to Justice Stevens and his  
dicta in Board of Regents.  Where Justice Stevens in Board of Regents was  
deferential toward the NCAA with the statement that the association “needs  
ample latitude” to preserve the “revered tradition of amateurism,”129 the Ninth 
Circuit in O’Bannon showed deference to Justice Stevens with its finding that 
nothing in Board of Regents limited the application of antitrust laws to the 
NCAA’s amateurism rules.130  To this end, the Ninth Circuit even stated that it 
did “not treat considered dicta from the Supreme Court lightly” and, where  
applicable, would afford Justice Stevens’s dicta with “appropriate  
deference.”131  But to the Ninth Circuit, that deference did not extend to it using 
what was actually a procompetitive justification (preservation of amateurism) 
to exempt the NCAA’s student-athlete compensation regulations from antitrust 
scrutiny as “automatically lawful. . . .”132  Our review of the decision leads to 
                                                          
127. 528 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2008).  In Bassett v. NCAA, the Sixth Circuit held that NCAA regulations  
prohibiting “improper inducements” to athletic recruits were “explicitly non-commercial.”  Id. at 433.  
128. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1066 (9th Cir. 2015). 
129. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984). 
130. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1063. 
131. Id. (quoting United States v. Augustine, 712 F.3d 1290, 1295 (9th Cir. 2013)). 
132. Id. at 1063–64. 
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the conclusion that the court in O’Bannon took substantial measures because it 
understood the magnitude of its decision.  By subjecting the NCAA’s  
amateurism regulations to the rule of reason analysis, the Ninth Circuit deviated 
from the line of district and circuit cases that interpreted Justice Stevens’s dicta 
in ways that fortified the NCAA’s amateurism restrictions as noncommercial 
and, therefore, outside of § 1 jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit in 
O’Bannon may have been a bit clumsy in its analysis on first down, but the court 
gained positive yardage on the play and set the stage for the first step in the rule 
of reason analysis, which focused on the relevant markets. 
B. Second Down: The Markets 
Arguably, no hurdle has been more difficult to clear for student-athlete 
plaintiffs in establishing antitrust claims against the NCAA than step one of the 
rule of reason analysis, which requires plaintiffs to show “significant  
anticompetitive effects within a relevant market.”133  In fact, until O’Bannon, 
no student-driven litigation had ever progressed past this play.  The courts and  
circuits following Board of Regents had been steadfast in failing to find a  
relevant market within NCAA athletics for student-athletes.  While Tanaka, 
Walk-On Football Players, and even White provided the plaintiffs in O’Bannon 
with some traction for overcoming the relevant market hurdle, those cases held 
no precedential value for the Ninth Circuit.  Thus, the Plaintiffs in O’Bannon 
had the very daunting task of convincing the Ninth Circuit to be the first of the 
federal circuits to find a relevant market that would subject the NCAA’s  
amateurism provisions to the second step of the rule of reason analysis.134  
Initially, there were two purported markets at play in O’Bannon based on 
the district court’s determinations.  The first was the college education market.  
This market included the “unique bundles of goods and services” that FBS  
football and Division I basketball schools offer in recruiting against each other 
for the best student-athletes.135  The second market was a “group licensing  
market” for three submarkets in which student-athlete names, images, and  
                                                          
133. Id. at 1070 (quoting Tanaka v. Univ. of S. Cal., 252 F.3d 1059, 1063 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
134. See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328 (7th Cir. 2012).  The case involved an antitrust challenge 
to the cap the NCAA places on football scholarships.  While the Seventh Circuit in Agnew did not find 
a relevant market for student-athlete services, it disagreed with the district court’s determination that a 
relevant market could not be established.  In this instance, however, the court rejected the markets 
proffered by the plaintiffs, which were (1) a market for educational services similar to that which was 
alleged in White, and (2) a labor market for student-athlete services.  Id. at 346.  The primary problem 
the court had with the education product market was that it would include far more than those who were 
scholarship athletes; making the purported market unclear rather than cognizable.  Id.  The problem 
with the court had with the labor market was that the plaintiffs did not provide any evidence supporting 
the existence of the market.  Id. at 346–47. 
135. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 965 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
BAKER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 6/14/2016  5:29 PM 
2016] ANTITRUST AND MEDIA RIGHTS  353 
likenesses (NILs) were commercially licensed: (1) live game telecasts, (2) 
sports video games, and (3) game rebroadcasts, advertisements, and other ar-
chived materials.136 
On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit consolidated the two markets into 
one, the college education market.  In doing so, the court recognized three  
factual findings from the district court that were substantially supported by the 
record: “(1) that a cognizable ‘college education market’ exist[ed]” in the  
compensation for student-athlete recruits through the offering of scholarships 
and other “amenities” (coaching and facility use); (2) the NCAA’s  
compensation rules restrained the competition for student-athlete recruits so that 
programs were unable to offer compensation for the use of student-athlete NILs; 
and (3) the restraint imposed by the NCAA’s “compensation rules . . . ha[d] a 
significant anticompetitive effect on the college education market” by fixing the 
price for college attendance.137 Further, the Ninth Circuit found that the 
NCAA’s appeal “[did] not challenge the district court’s findings,” conceding 
the existence of a relevant college education market.138  Instead, the NCAA  
centered its defense on three “modest” positions for why the Plaintiffs did not 
establish a significant anticompetitive effect.139  
First, the NCAA argued that the Plaintiffs’ inability to show a decrease in 
output of scholarships within the college education market prevented them from 
demonstrating an anticompetitive effect.140  The NCAA pointed to increases in 
opportunities as proof that its regulations were not anticompetitive.141  The  
problem with that position, as the Ninth Circuit so easily pointed out, is that 
“output [reduction] is not the only [type] of anticompetitive effect.”142  Another 
type is found in horizontal “price-fixing . . . by purchasers,” and this is true even 
when the injured parties are sellers rather than consumers.143  The court looked 
to the district court’s determination that the students were harmed by the  
price-fixing agreement that they would only be compensated at the cost of  
grant-in-aid, thus valuing their NILs at zero.144  Thus, the price cap imposed by 
                                                          
136. Id. at 968. 
137. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1070. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
143. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 
334 U.S. 219, 235 (1948)).  The court also noted that various types of anticompetitive practices like 
prices raises, output reductions, and market divisions all had the same anticompetitive effects.  Id. at 
1071 (citing Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 777 (1999)). 
144. Id. (citing O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 972–73 (N.D. Cal. 2014)). 
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the compensation regulations produced anticompetitive effects.145  
Next, the court quickly dismissed the NCAA’s second argument that there 
could be no anticompetitive effect because student-athlete NILs were worth 
nothing.146  The problem with this position is that the NCAA set the value.147  
The Ninth Circuit then rejected the NCAA’s final anticompetitive effect  
position; the argument that, in the absence of a cap, student-athletes had de  
minimis value in their NIL rights.148  The court found that the NCAA’s last 
position was flawed because the “too small to matter” defense was inconsistent 
with the Supreme Court precedent in Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc.149 In 
Catalano, the Court stated, “It is no excuse that the prices fixed are themselves 
reasonable.”150  The Ninth Circuit also relied on reasoning in Board of Regents 
in which the Court held that the NCAA’s television plan could have  
anticompetitive effects without need for delving into the details of how much 
the price was fixed.151  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon upheld the 
district court’s decision “that the [NCAA’s] compensation rules ha[d] a  
significant anticompetitive effect on the college education market.”152 
C. Third Down: The NCAA’s Procompetitive Justifications 
On third and long, the NCAA found itself with the burden of proving that 
the anticompetitive effects imposed by the compensation regulations were  
justified by offsetting procompetitive effects. To defend its compensation rules, 
the NCAA turned to the same tried, but not always true, justifications on which 
the organization relied on in the few cases that courts found to be at the  
commercial end of the dichotomy: (1) promotion of amateur athletics, (2)  
promotion of competitive balance, (3) the integration of student-athletes within 
the school community, “and (4) increasing output in the college education  
market . . . .”153 At the same time, however, the NCAA focused only on the 
promotion of amateurism in its arguments on appeal.154 For this reason, the 
Ninth Circuit had little difficulty “accept[ing] the district court’s . . . findings 
that the compensation rules [did] not promote competitive balance [or] increase 
                                                          
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 1069. 
148. Id. at 1071. 
149. Id. (citing Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 650 (1980) (per curiam)). 
150. Catalano, 446 U.S. at 647. 
151. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1072 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 104–05 (1984)). 
152. Id. 
153. Id.; O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 999 (N.D. Cal. 2014).  
154. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1072.  
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output in the college education market.”155 
As for the output argument, the Ninth Circuit was left unconvinced by the 
NCAA’s claim that its compensation restrictions were procompetitive on the 
position that they widened student-athlete choice.156  Specifically, the court  
recognized that if the NCAA’s compensation rules were abandoned, or at least 
loosened, then student-athletes would actually have a wider range of choices in 
terms of which schools to select because student-athletes could make  
decisions based on scholarship offerings.157  Further, the Ninth Circuit found 
that lifting the limits on compensation might actually provide student-athletes 
with the financial means to stay in school longer based on income derived from 
the use of their NILs.158  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit rejected the NCAA’s 
outcome or “choices” argument.159 
The Ninth Circuit, however, was convinced that NCAA compensation rules 
served two purposes: “[(1)] integrating academics with athletics, and [(2)]  
‘preserving the popularity of the NCAA’s product’” through the preservation of 
the “revered tradition of amateurism.”160  The court found that “the  
district court[’s findings] and . . . record support[] . . . a concrete  
procompetitive effect in the NCAA’s commitment to amateurism . . . .”161  The 
court recognized that the premise of this effect is consistent with Justice  
Stevens’s dicta in which he assumed that consumers of college football prefer 
that particular brand to professional football because of the “academic tradition” 
associated with the college product.162 
D. Fourth Down: Alternatives  
The recognition of procompetitive justifications for an anticompetitive  
restraint shifts the burden back to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s  
justifications could be met with a virtually effective and less-restrictive  
alternative.163  The Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon added to that burden by  
recognizing Board of Regents’ deferential mandate that the NCAA be afforded 
“ample latitude” as the superintendent of collegiate athletics.164  With that  
                                                          
155. Id. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 1073. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. 
160. Id.; NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984). 
161. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1073.  
162. Id. at 1074 (quoting Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101–02). 
163. County of Tuolumne v. Sonora Cmty. Hosp., 236 F.3d 1148, 1159 (9th Cir. 2001). 
164. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1074 (quoting Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120). 
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burden and deference in mind, the Ninth Circuit addressed the two less  
restrictive alternatives that the district court identified: (1) allowing NCAA 
member institutions to extend the compensation limit to cover the full cost of 
attendance; and (2) allowing schools to pay student-athletes a modest amount 
(up to $5,000.00 per year) of deferred cash in exchange for the use of  
student-athlete NILs.165 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court’s first alternative, finding 
that a cost-of-attendance allowance would not tarnish the revered tradition of 
amateurism because the money would be used to cover “legitimate costs” to 
attend school.166  The court could find no evidence in the record “suggest[ing] 
that consumers of college sports would be[] less interested . . . if  
[student-]athletes” were provided the allowance.167 Similarly, the court could 
not find anything in the record supporting the notion that a cost-of-attendance 
allowance “would impede the integration of student-athletes into their  
academic communities.”168  The Ninth Circuit accepted the cost-of-attendance 
alternative over fear mongering from the NCAA and its amici, a collection of 
antitrust law scholars.169  Both the NCAA and the amici cautioned that such a 
finding would open the floodgates to all sorts of new litigation directed at  
incremental changes in NCAA policy.170  Additionally, the NCAA and its amici 
asserted that it is not the role of the courts to make marginal market adjustments 
based on applications of antitrust laws.171 Instead, they believed that the cap 
should have been preserved because it served a “reasonably . . . valid business 
purpose . . . .”172 
While the Ninth Circuit agreed with the NCAA and its amici that, as a  
general rule, “[A]ntitrust law [should not be used] to make marginal  
adjustments to broadly reasonable market restraints,” the court disagreed with 
the argument that a reasonably valid business purpose should trump a  
                                                          
165. Id. at 1074–79 (referencing O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 1004–07 (N.D. Cal. 
2014)). 
166. Id. at 1074–75 (quoting O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 983). 
167. Id. at 1075. 
168. Id.  
169. Id.; see also Brief for Law and Economics and Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Appellant, O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015) (Nos. 14-16601, 14-17068), 
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2014/11/24/14-16601%20Ami-
cus%20brief%20by%20Law%20&%20Econ%20Scholars.pdf. 
170. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1075; Brief for Law and Economics and Antitrust Scholars as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Appellant, supra note 169, at 3. 
171. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1075; Brief for Law and Economics and Antitrust Scholars as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Appellant, supra note 169, at 13. 
172. O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1075. 
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less-restrictive alternative in antitrust analysis.173  What the Ninth Circuit was 
perhaps too polite to address in its response to the NCAA and its amici was the 
audacity of the reasonably valid business purpose position.  Had the court  
accepted the notion that the mere existence of a reasonably valid business  
purpose precludes evidence of a less-restrictive alternative, the Ninth Circuit 
would have effectively altered the rule of reason so as to do away with its third 
prong.  After all, the third step in the rule always follows a court’s finding of 
reasonably valid business purposes that have been labeled as procompetitive 
justifications. Instead, the court recognized that the degree of modification to 
the market is irrelevant as long as the means serves as a less-restrictive  
alternative for achieving the valid business purpose.174 
The Ninth Circuit then addressed the floodgates argument and did so by 
restraining its holding to the specific NCAA restraints that limited  
student-athlete compensation to grant-in-aid.175  The court cautioned potential 
classes of future plaintiffs that its decision was not a declaration of open  
season for shooting down NCAA regulations, stating that courts were not “free 
to micromanage organizational rules or to strike down largely beneficial  
market restraints with impunity.”176  Rather, the Ninth Circuit limited its  
decision to a restraint that it found to be “patently and inexplicably stricter 
than . . . necessary.”177 
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in finding a 
less-restrictive alternative that would have allowed student-athletes to profit off 
of their NILs.178 The court contrasted the cost-of-attendance option with NIL 
compensation and found that the two were not equally effective in meeting the 
procompetitive purpose of preserving consumer interest in amateur athletics.179 
The Ninth Circuit found that the district court ignored the premise behind the 
preservation of amateurism justification: “that not paying student-athletes is 
precisely what makes them amateurs.”180  With this finding, the court vacated 
the district court’s injunction that required its members to pay student-athletes 
deferred compensation of up to $5,000 per year for the use of their NILs.181 
                                                          
173. Id. 
174. Id. (citing Am. Motor Inns, Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230, 1249 (3d Cir. 1975)). 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
178. Id. at 1076. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
181. Id. at 1078–79. 
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E. Overtime: Did the Plaintiffs Win, Lose, or Draw in the Ninth Circuit? 
Not long after the opinion went public, a plethora of pundits did the same 
with their opinions on the ramifications of the most high-profile antitrust action 
involving the NCAA since Board of Regents.  Two trains of expert thought 
emerged from the coverage of the case in both traditional and social media: (1) 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision was incredibly significant because it subjected 
NCAA student-athlete regulations to the rule of reason analysis,182 and (2) the 
decision was not significant because the NCAA had already permitted its  
members to provide cost-of-attendance allowances.183  Granted, O’Bannon had 
a negligible impact on the operation of college football, and college athletics for 
that matter.  Yet, those who questioned the case’s importance failed to properly 
appreciate the fact that O’Bannon was the first circuit decision to recognize a 
relevant college education market and subject the NCAA’s amateurism  
provisions to all three steps of the rule of reason analysis.  And in doing so, the 
Ninth Circuit deviated from the de facto exemption from antitrust for the 
NCAA’s amateurism provisions that decades of district and circuit court  
decisions developed based on near dogmatic reliance on Justice Stevens’s dicta 
in Board of Regents.  Thus, there is now a divide in the federal circuits on how 
antitrust law applies to the NCAA’s regulation of student-athletes and whether 
a relevant college education market exists.  
The presence of a possible split among the federal circuits could provide 
either the student-athletes or the NCAA with ammunition for a request of  
certiorari to the Supreme Court following the resolution of the case in the Ninth 
Circuit.  Currently, the case is pending resolution of the student-athletes’ request 
for en banc consideration before the Ninth Circuit.  In addition to O’Bannon, 
there are at least three other antitrust actions (Jenkins v. NCAA, Alston v. NCAA, 
and Pugh v. NCAA) brought by student-athlete plaintiffs that are in early stages 
of litigation. Jenkins is arguably the most threatening of the three because it was 
brought within the Ninth Circuit by famed antitrust and labor law attorney  
                                                          
182. See, e.g., Jason Kurtyka, Post-O’Bannon, the Fight Between Student-Athletes and the NCAA 
Rages On, JEFFREY S. MOORAD CTR. FOR STUDY SPORTS L., http://lawweb2009.law.villa-
nova.edu/sportslaw/?p=3339 (last visited June 9, 2016); Aaron Leibowitz, O’Bannon Ruling Allows 
‘Amateurism’ Argument to Continue—for Now, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 2, 2015), 
http://www.si.com/cauldron/2015/10/01/ed-obannon-ncaa-lawsuit-appeal-decision. 
183. See, e.g., Jeremy Jarrett, The Great Escape: The NCAA Receives a Tremendous Ruling for Now 
and the Future in the O’Bannon Appeal Decision, SPORTS ESQUIRES (Oct. 1, 2015), http://thesportses-
quires.com/the-great-escape-the-ncaa-receives-a-tremendous-ruling-for-now-and-the-future-in-the-
obannon-appeal-decision/; Joe Nocera, O’Bannon’s Hollow Victory Over the N.C.A.A., N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/03/opinion/joe-nocera-obannons-hollow-vic-
tory.html?_r=0; Marc Tracy & Ben Strauss, Court Strikes Down Payments to College Athletes, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/sports/obannon-ncaa-case-court-of-ap-
peals-ruling.html;  
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Jeffrey Kessler and aims to “strike down permanently the restrictions that pre-
vent athletes in Division I basketball and the top tier of college football from 
being fairly compensated for the billions of dollars in revenues that they help 
generate.”184  If the Plaintiffs in Jenkins succeed, the NCAA would not be  
permitted to impose any cap on student-athlete compensation.185  The uphill 
battle for Kessler and his Plaintiffs is in convincing the court to go dramatically 
further than what was done in O’Bannon by rejecting the position asserted by 
Justice Stevens in dicta in Board of Regents that “amateurism” is needed to  
create the product of college football and basketball.  
And this brings us to the multi-billion dollar question, are NCAA  
amateurism provisions necessary to the creation of the product of college  
athletics?  Certainly, aspects of the NCAA’s amateurism regulations (i.e.,  
academic requirements) distinguish college from professional football.   
Further, the possibility exists that some consumers consider academic aspects 
of college football important.  After all, the fact that NCAA athletic programs 
represent universities and alumni, students, faculty, and staff from those schools 
may place value in the fact that NCAA athletes are also students.  Thus, the  
academic nature of college football may be so intertwined with the product that 
it drives some degree of sport consumption.  Perhaps this academic nature is 
what the Ninth Circuit actually referenced when it recognized a procompetitive 
justification for the integration of student-athletes on college campuses.  All the 
same, this position is also nothing more than an assumption that is not supported 
by any empirical economic evidence and “[l]egal presumptions that rest on  
formalistic distinctions rather than actual market realities are generally  
disfavored in antitrust law.”186 
The Ninth Circuit in O’Bannon followed a line of cases that relied on legal 
presumptions inherited from Justice Stevens’s dicta by accepting the NCAA’s 
compensation cap as necessary to the creation of the product of college  
football.  In doing so, the Ninth Circuit linked student-athlete compensation to 
the academic requirements found within the NCAA’s Bylaws.  Yet,  
student-athlete compensation limits can be severed from academic requirements 
while still preserving the academic nature of college football.  Take, for  
example, graduate student assistantships. Graduate assistants are graduate  
students who work for their university in some capacity (e.g., teaching classes 
and assisting with research).187  Compensation provided through graduate  
                                                          
184. Tom Farrey, Jeffrey Kessler Files Against NCAA, ESPN (Mar. 18, 2014), 
http://espn.go.com/ncaa/story/_/id/10620388/anti-trust-claim-filed-jeffrey-kessler-challenges-ncaa-
amateur-model. 
185. Id. 
186. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 466–67 (1992). 
187. Grant M. Hayden, “The University Works Because We Do”: Collective Bargaining Rights for  
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assistantships varies depending on the academic program and the institution.  It 
is common for graduate students to select institutions, at least in part, based on 
the compensation package provided through a graduate assistantship.  However, 
the graduate students who make those selections are still students and the  
academic nature of their positions and their integration within the institution 
remains intact.  Therefore, even if we take the leap and accept the assumption 
that the NCAA’s academic requirements (i.e., those that make athletes students) 
are necessary to the creation of the product of college athletics, that necessity 
does not justify a horizontal cap on student-athlete compensation.  
Thus, the real issue in cases like O’Bannon and Jenkins is whether caps that 
limit student-athlete compensation are necessary to the creation of the product 
of college athletics.  Framing the issue in this manner, however, should pose a 
problem for the NCAA because a collection of sport management  
professors who wrote as amici in support of the student-athletes in O’Bannon 
could find nothing in their review of relevant sport motivation literature that 
supported the assumption that consumers of college athletics do so because of 
limits on student-athlete compensation.188  In fact, the only study the NCAA 
could produce in support of its position was dismissed by the district court for 
lacking credibility.189  The study was discredited because it included a  
questionnaire with items that were flawed in a way that was found to have  
influenced participant responses.190  Despite the lack of empirical support for 
its position, both the district court and the Ninth Circuit accepted the NCAA’s  
procompetitive justification as valid and both cited Justice Stevens’s dicta from 
Board of Regents in doing so.  
Accordingly, if there is one key takeaway from O’Bannon that future  
classes of student-athlete plaintiffs must note, it is that, for some inexplicable 
reason, they bear the burden of disproving an assumption that consumers care 
about student-athlete compensation.  As Kessler and his Plaintiffs in Jenkins 
and the student-athlete plaintiffs in Alston prepare their materials for trial, they 
would be smart to include any empirical economic evidence that supports the 
position that consumers will still consume college athletics even if the  
student-athletes receive more than what is provided via cost-of-attendance  
allowances.  Specifically, student-athlete plaintiffs must force the hand of the 
court with exacting and irrefutable evidence that disproves the assumption  
                                                          
Graduate Assistants, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1233, 1236 (2001). 
188. Brief for Sport Management Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellee at  
7–8, O’Bannon v. NCAA, 803 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015) (Nos. 14-16601, 14-17068), 
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2015/01/30/14-16601%20amicus%20brief%201-
28%20by%20Sport%20Management%20Profs%20dkt%2057.pdf. 
189. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 975 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
190. Id. 
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derived from Justice Stevens’s dicta.  
On the other end of the spectrum, any study presented by the NCAA in 
defense of its compensation limits should be required by courts to actually  
evidence that consumption would be affected if student-athletes are  
compensated beyond the cost-of-attendance. Consumer attitudes about  
student-athlete pay are meaningless in the market if they do not influence  
consumption habits. But most importantly, consumer preference should never 
justify horizontal restraints on labor costs. That is what the cost-of-attendance 
cap is—a cost-saving measure disguised as consumer welfare protection.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
In classic Greek mythology, Pandora’s curiosity led her to open a box that 
forever shaped life.191  Pandora was warned by Zeus not to open the box, but 
she did and from it escaped all evils known to man.  The first of all women tried 
quickly to close the box and limit what was let into the world, but it was too 
late.  In 1984, the Supreme Court fully opened an already leaking box with its 
decision in Board of Regents and in doing so let all sorts of problems into  
college football.  Similar to how Pandora attempted to limit what escaped from 
the infamous box, the majority in Board of Regents also tried to control the  
degree of what it unleashed on college football by shielding from antitrust law 
the NCAA’s amateurism provisions, and just like Pandora, the Court’s efforts 
were unsuccessful.  
It is time for a new antitrust approach for big-time college athletics,  
particularly football.  In the shadow of Board of Regents, college football has 
ballooned into a multibillion dollar industry.  The NCAA’s amici of antitrust 
legal scholars argued in their brief, “Antitrust cases are . . . poor vehicles for 
courts and agencies to socially reengineer products and services to their  
liking.”192  Yet, that is exactly what the courts have done by shielding the 
NCAA’s limits on student-athlete compensation from antitrust law.  Courts have 
preserved the “revered tradition of amateurism”193 by preventing inflation of 
athlete compensation; inflation that is expected in a free market.  Thus, the time 
has come to lift the veil of amateurism from the face of college football and 
basketball and subject them to the same antitrust analyses that apply to their 
professional counterparts.  Cases like O’Bannon, Jenkins, and Alston provide 
courts with the opportunity to effect that change.  
                                                          
191. For a detailed account of the Pandora myth, see generally MARK P.O. MORFORD & ROBERT J. 
LENARDON, CLASSICAL MYTHOLOGY (6th ed. 1999). 
192. Brief for Law and Economics and Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant, 
supra note 169, at 3. 
193. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984). 
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No matter what the Ninth Circuit decides in regards to the  
student-athletes’ en banc request, the court’s final resolution of the case likely 
will not end the debate.194  The can will be kicked down the road until it  
eventually reaches the steps of the Supreme Court building.  Whether the case 
that gets there is O’Bannon or some other, the applicability of antitrust to NCAA 
student-athlete seems destined for Supreme Court determination.  This means a 
reconsideration of the reasoning in Justice Stevens’s Board of Regents dicta.  To 
that extent, O’Bannon, or whatever case makes it to the high court, is to Board 
of Regents what Flood was to Federal Baseball Club.  Will that Court make the 
same mistake that Justice Stevens said was made in Flood by preserving an  
antitrust analysis that no longer made sense?  Based on his comments to the 
Sports Lawyers Association, the possibility exists that Justice Stevens would do 
things differently if he could hear the case that challenges his reasoning in Board 
of Regents.  But just as Justice Holmes was not around for Flood, Justice Ste-
vens will have no say in O’Bannon.  The great antitrust jurist now finds himself 
in the same spot as the rest of us, in the cheap seats watching to see how things 
play out. 
 
                                                          
194. At the time this Article was first written, the en banc motion before the Ninth Circuit had yet 
to be heard and decided. The Ninth Circuit has since rejected that request. 
